Captive labor bracero program

No wonder growers refer to West Indians as an ideal labor force, combining "docility and obedience" with high productivity. But these reasons are not the argument they use to request foreign workers from the INS. In theory, only the "unavailability" of domestic workers can open the door to contract workers from abroad. Also, in theory, the wages and working conditions of domestic workers are protected from the adverse effects that may result from the importation of foreign workers.

Inherent in the practice of this program, however, is a very different story. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act PL , final authority for deciding whether foreign workers should be admitted rests with the Attorney General, "after consultation with appropriate agencies of Government upon petition of the importing employer. Before any H-2 visas are granted, current INS regulations require that the Department of Labor certify that no qualified persons already in the country are available, and that wages and working conditions of workers similarly employed in the United States will not be adversely affected.

To prove that domestic workers are unavailable, growers must file a job offer with the state employment service, for as many workers as they require, and offer wages that are equal to or above the minimum wage rate set for foreign workers. This job offer is then circulated to all 50 states and U.

Employment Service. The Wagner-Peyser Act of set up this interstate clearance system to match workers from one state to jobs in another. Growers must prove that no workers are available from any of these sources. What's required on paper is rarely done in practice, however. Critics of the contract program say that growers rarely make a serious effort to recruit domestic workers, and often reject them in favor of contract labor. If a recent case in Texas is any indication, the government seems inclined to blink an eye now and then.

Melon and onion growers in the Presidio Valley of Texas requested certification for Mexican workers to harvest their crops. The Department of Labor refused to certify a labor shortage. But an intense lobbying campaign by growers, culminating in a personal visit to the President from Texas Congressman Richard C.

White, led to a presidential directive to approve the request. Some domestic workers who had already contracted with these growers were told they were no longer needed. Examples of maneuvers to hire foreign over domestic workers abound. But the question remains: with high unemployment rates throughout the East, and higher rates in Puerto Rico; with 5, workers lining up in Detroit to answer an ad for 50 openings, how can growers argue that domestic workers are not available for agriculture?

The answer is that domestic workers are not available in sufficient numbers because wage levels have been kept too low to attract them. As indicated by its name, this "adverse effect wage rate" is supposed to protect the jobs and wages of domestic farm workers by setting a wage floor for agriculture.

In other words, before employers can hire foreign workers, they must first offer domestic workers the adverse effect wage rate; and only if an insufficient number apply, can the remaining job openings be filled by foreign workers. On the surface, this arrangement sounds quite reasonable.

Yet a closer look reveals that the adverse effect wage rate acts not as a minimum wage level, but rather as a ceiling on wages offered to all workers in agriculture.

Growers never have to raise their wage offer above this rate in order to attract a labor force. If there are no takers at this rate, growers get the green light to apply for a virtually inexhaustible supply of foreign workers.

The undesirability of agricultural jobs thus becomes self-perpetuating. Furthermore, the ceiling set by the adverse effect wage rate has been historically depressed by the use of foreign contract labor, among other factors such as the lack of unionization in the fields. The first adverse effect wage rates were established as a response to growing criticism of the bracero program and its effect on domestic workers.

They were based on the prevailing wage rates in states employing Mexican braceros in That growers imported braceros precisely to avoid paying higher wages to domestic workers is hardly a disputed fact. In a speech, President Kennedy cited the program's drawbacks, even as he signed a bill to extend it: "Studies of the operation of the Mexican labor program have clearly established that it is adversely affecting the wages, working conditions and employment possibilities of our own agricultural workers.

If one combines the wage factor with all the non- wage advantages of hiring foreign contract labor, the fate of domestic farmworkers is sealed. For inherent in the concept of contract labor is the growers' ability to exert a degree of control over the labor force that vir- tually no other system affords. They also compare the H-2 program to a similar contract system devised by the Commonwealth Government of Puerto Rico, to supply farm labor to many East Coast harvests.

A clear understanding of these programs is needed now, before expansion plans proceed. For any program that attempts to maintain the second-class status of foreign workers in the United States provides employers with the means to divide workers. He was questioned about plans to expand the H-2 program in agriculture. He answered by saying, "Well, I don't think it would be terribly much greater than it is now, which is 18, I'd be surprised if it's more than , Wayne A.

V, No. Petersburg, Florida: Community Action Fund, , Richard B. Like this article? Support our work. D onate now. Search form Search. Enter your keywords. As a new Foreword notes, worries about immigration and labor persist, as does basic dysfunction of the present form of INS. Digging deeper reveals the persistence of a structural catch General history of the problem of illegal immigration in the United States that includes a chapter covering Operation Wetback and the bracero program.

Valdes, Dennis Nodin. After the United States entered World War I in , Mexican workers played an important role in keeping American agriculture productive. However, despite the contributions the program made to American agriculture and to the Mexican economy, it had many vocal critics in both countries.

Country of Publication. Kitty Calavita Politics and Government English. Download ePub Download Fb2. Rating: 4. This is a welcome republication of an excellent law and society classic. Based on creative and careful analysis of original archival and interview data, Calavita's study explores an important and often misunderstood period of immigration policy in the U. One of the best studies of the growing U.

This is a book that should be widely assigned in law schools and in college classes on administrative law, immigration politics, and "law and society" studies generally. The ups and downs of administrative discretion, Congressional oversight and conflicting roles of agencies is not unlike many of the issues that exist today, with illegal immigrants replacing the braceros. Those interested in immigration and policymaking would benefit from reviewing this rich analysis. Thanks to author Calavita, American society may remember the forgotten braceros, the close to 5 million Mexicans who came to this country between and to feed us all during and after WWII.

The contribution made by the braceros should be recognized as we embark in the new millennium.